Introduction
During the last decades, the demand for meat and milk has increased, particularly in developing countries where consumption of meat increased almost three times more than in developed countries (Delgado, 2003) . Pig production is becoming increasingly popular, with pork and poultry contributing 76% of the increased meat consumption in the developing world between 1982 and 1998 (Delgado et al., 2001) .
In sub-Saharan Africa, millions of small scale farmers efficiently supply the great majority of the meat, milk and fish markets. Animal source food products have a high nutritional value which enhances public health, while the production, transportation, processing and retailing of these products provide income and employment to millions.
Over the past three decades, the reported pig population has increased 1500%, from 0.19 to 3.2 million in Uganda (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2008) . In 2011, Uganda had the highest per capita consumption of pork in East Africa at 3.4 kg/person/year . More than 1.1 million poor households in Uganda own pigs, mostly managed by women and children in backyard activities. Indeed, 80% of pig production in Uganda is carried out by smallholder crop-livestock farmers . Despite this dependence on livestock, there is a strong association between poverty, hunger, livestock keeping and zoonoses (Grace et al., 2012) .
Furthermore, pigs are the only domestic livestock species presently known to be naturally infected with Ebola viruses (Barrette et al., 2009 ). The disease course in pigs depends on infective strain; Reston Ebola virus (REBOV) causes asymptomatic signs to mild respiratory symptoms (Barrette et al., 2009) , and Zaire Ebola virus (ZEBOV) causes fever and severe lung pathology (Kobinger et al., 2011) .
In Uganda, the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) aims to support development of the pig value chains through risk-based approaches to ensure food safety. A risk assessment and risk map to determine the threat Ebola viruses, poses in the pig value chains in Uganda was warranted.
Materials and Methods
Relevant articles in the published and grey literature were identified using online databases, visiting university libraries and interviewing experts within Uganda. Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines were used for the retrieval and screening of all articles (Moher et al., 2009 (Daily Monitor and New Vision) . Relevant searches using the search terms 'Uganda' AND 'Ebola', 'Ebola' AND 'pig' OR 'pork' OR 'porcine' OR 'swine' were performed on all the above databases and websites.
Pig distribution in Uganda (see Fig. 1 ) is part of the global distribution of livestock mapping that was carried out by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Robinson and Wint, 2014 ).
An additional fifteen expert interviews were conducted using a semistructured questionnaire. Finally, unpublished student theses (Bachelor, Masters and PhD) at Makerere University, College of Veterinary Medicine, Animal Resources and Biosecurity, were reviewed from 1990 to the present for relevant content on Ebola virus in pigs or diseases in pigs that shared clinical symptoms or histopathological changes similar to Ebola virus infection in pigs.
To investigate the interactions of domestic pigs with wildlife, a questionnaire was administered to seventeen animal health professionals with regular field experience in ten geopolitical regions that also reflect basic agro-ecological zones in Uganda.
A risk map investigating the spatial overlap of known factors supporting potential zoonotic Ebola virus spillover from animals to humans in Uganda was developed using ArcGIS version 10.2. Risk was represented binomially as high or low in terms of (i) suitable zoonotic niche for Ebola viruses in Uganda at 5 9 5 km pixel unit (Pigott et al., 2014) , (ii) number of pigs per square kilometre at 1 9 1 km pixel unit (Robinson et al., 2007; Robinson and Wint, 2014) and (iii) number of people living in extreme poverty (1.25 USD/day) at 10 9 10 km pixel unit (Wood et al., 2010) . All data layers were resampled to 1 9 1 km pixel unit before overlaying. The threshold for high pig density and human poverty distribution in Uganda was described as above the median which was 0 pigs/km 2 and 833 people living in extreme poverty/10 km 2 , respectively. As such, 'high' pig density is essentially a reflection of the presence and absence of pig keeping in the country.
Poverty has been considered a factor for increased risk for zoonotic disease transmission of Ebola virus and other diseases (Grace et al., 2012; Bausch and Schwarz, 2014) . Therefore, the use of poverty as a risk was justified due to recent evidence suggesting its link to bush meat trade (Wolfe and Daszak, 2005) and increased animal contact (Paige et al., 2014) . In addition, protected forested areas were represented on the map due to the occurrence of higher human population at the edges of protected areas Becquart et al., 2010) and the relevance of forested areas for potential zoonotic transmission (Monath, 1999; Peterson et al., 2004; Pourrut et al., 2005; Becquart et al., 2010; Switzer and Tang, 2012) .
The zoonotic niche data were adapted from a recent mapped model of the predicted environmental suitability for zoonotic transmission of Ebola virus in Africa (Pigott et al., 2014) . We converted the continuous probability of risk to a binary map classifying pixels as either high or low risk.
Results and Discussion
The systematic literature review identified the primary factors that support potential zoonotic transmission of Ebola virus in Uganda from pigs as (i) the lack of serological evidence for presumed reservoir species, particularly in Uganda, (ii) the number of human index cases unable to account for their source of infection, particularly in Uganda, (iii) domestic pig habitat overlap with potential Ebola virus zoonotic host environments, (iv) reported interactions at the human-pig-wildlife interface that could support transmission, (v) fever in pigs as a commonly reported problem by pig farmers and 6) temporal correlation of outbreaks with peak pork consumption periods.
The lack of serological evidence for specific reservoir species, particularly in Uganda Anecdotal evidence suggests bats as a potential reservoir host of Ebola virus. In the 1976 outbreak of Sudan Ebola virus (SUDV), the first six human cases were cotton factory employees who worked in a room where bats roosted ). In 1994, in Côte d'Ivoire, chimpanzees which developed Ebola virus disease (EVD) had been feeding in a fig tree together with fruit bats for 2 weeks before developing the disease (Formenty et al., 1999) . The 1989 The -1990 The and 1996 REBOV outbreaks in primate facilities were linked back to a single export facility in the Philippines which was a former fruit orchard where animals were potentially exposed to fruit bats (Goldsmith, 2010) . In addition, the index case in the 2007 ZEBOV outbreak in DRC was linked to direct exposure to freshly killed bats bought from hunters .
The serological evidence for fruit bats as the reservoir species for Ebola virus is compelling (Reed, 2012; Olival and Hayman, 2014) ; however, there are still distinct gaps in knowledge. To date, there have been no successful attempts at Ebola virus isolation in any bat species (see Table 1 ). Three main species have consistently been found antibody and PCR positive to ZEBOV in Africa and are thus presumed to be natural reservoirs of Ebola virus: Franquet's epauletted fruit bat (Epomops franqueti), little collared fruit bat (Myonycteris torquata) and the hammer-headed fruit bat (Hypsignathus monstrosus) Olival and Hayman, 2014) . Pilot work in Uganda has found Epomophorus labiatus, Rousettus aegyptiacus and Eidolon helvum ZEBOV seropositive (Reed, 2012) . However, there are currently no confirmed bat hosts for the Sudan and Bundibugyo Ebola viruses found in Uganda.
Despite speculations on other potential mammalian reservoir species (Peterson et al., 2004 ) and large post-outbreak ecological sampling of wildlife and domestic species in Africa (Olson et al., 2012) , there is limited and inconsistent serological evidence for other species involvement. The main wildlife species found to have evidence of harbouring Ebola viruses includes non-human primates, duikers, dogs and small rodents and shrews (Olson et al., 2012) .
Presently, pigs are the only livestock species found naturally infected with REBOV (Barrette et al., 2009 ) and have been experimentally infected with ZEBOV (Kobinger et al., 2011) . Surveillance in endemic Africa has been limited, with only two sampling efforts reported with very small sample sizes -12 samples from two outbreaks in DRC 1976 and 1995 (Olson et al., 2012) and 31 samples from the 2012 Kibaale outbreak in Uganda (personal communication, Dr. Trevor Shoemaker). No serological evidence for the endemic African species of Ebola virus in pigs currently exists. Anecdotal accounts of widespread pig deaths before outbreaks have been reported, (Katatyi, 2014) , but analysis into cause of death has not been reported.
The number of human index cases unable to account for their source of infection, particularly in Uganda
There have been a number of human index cases of EVD in previous outbreaks with no known contact with non-human primates or bats (Table 2) fuelling investigations for other zoonotic reservoirs. In the 1976 outbreak in Sudan 4.9% (14/284) of cases and 17.4% (55/216) of cases during the 1996 outbreak in Kikwit, DRC had no direct physical contact with an infected person or known infected carcass (Roels and Bloom, 1999; Allela et al., 2005) . The source of infection in the 2007 Bundibugyo outbreak (Butagira et al., 2007) and 2012 Kibaale outbreak (ProMED-mail 2012) was speculated as contact with a monkey, but remains unconfirmed in these outbreaks and unknown in all other outbreaks in Uganda.
Domestic pig habitat overlap with potential Ebola virus zoonotic host environments
In Uganda, mixed cropping-livestock subsistence systems are often interspersed with forested or woodland mosaic landscapes which are suitable fruit bat and non-human primate habitats (Herrero et al., 2009 ). These landscapes are particularly prevalent in the central and western part of the country which roughly correlates with pig distribution in Uganda (Fig. 1) . Of the eight fruit bat species found in Uganda and suspected of being Ebola virus reservoirs, seven of them are found in forest or rainforest biomes with four of them having documented associations with agricultural or urban/suburban habitats (IUCN 2013). A study from the western region in Uganda found that subsistence farmers and those living near small patches of remnant forests (0.5-3 km 2 ) had increased incidences of general contact including pigs and primates (Paige et al., 2014) . This anthrobiome is a suitable setting for the hypothesized zoonotic Ebola virus epidemiological cycle involving pigs. Pig production occurs in all previous Ebola virus outbreak districts at a density of at least 0-5 pigs/km 2 . Furthermore, four of the five outbreak districts occur in regions where there are areas of >19 pigs/km 2 (Fig. 2) .
Reported interactions at the human-pig-wildlife interface that could support transmission
Suggested modes of transmission between non-human primates, fruit bats and pigs include competition for fruit leading to spatiotemporal clustering of these frugivorous animals creating an increased likelihood of spillover (Bausch and Schwarz, 2014) . This scenario is supported by the questionnaire respondents who reported domestic pigs having shared feeding spots with bats and primates (Fig. 2) ; mainly in competition around fruiting trees. Banana plantations near houses and gardens were specific locales where this occurred because these species feed on weeds, fallen banana fruit, household refuse and a number of other plants that grow in the banana plantation. Furthermore, aggressive interactions were reported by some between domestic pigs and primates (Fig. 2) , presumably involving competition for food. Considering the deficit of knowledge regarding the host species of Ebola virus in the wild, it is interesting to note the different potential transmission routes between domestic pigs and a variety of wildlife which may play a role in the epidemiology of the virus.
Furthermore, domestic pigs are often left to roam free in Uganda , so their habit range can extend beyond smallholder farm perimeters where they encroach on various habitats. Collared free-ranging domestic pigs in western Kenya travelled an average of 4340 m in a 12 h period and had a mean home range of 10 343 m 2 (Thomas et al., 2013) . In this study, free-ranging domestic pigs travelled large distances, throughout the day and night, with almost half of the time spent outside their homestead, extending the geographic range and habitats these pigs scavenge and travel in. This large range and lengthier scavenging timeframe could be risk factors for Ebola virus infection both between domestic pigs and between domestic pigs and wildlife. In fact, animal health professionals reported wildlife in livestock areas as being common across all regions of Uganda (Fig. 3) . Primates were the most common species group reported to frequent livestock areas, followed by bats and wild pigs. Regions where primates, bats and wild pigs are common and where domestic pigs occur, include western, Nile and northern. Wild pigs were reported as most common in the western region, where two of the past Ebola virus outbreaks have occurred.
Questionnaire respondents reported human interactions with bush pigs and common warthogs across all regions as a very occasional to several times a month or year occurrence (Fig. 3) . Physical contact between humans and pigs was reported with attacks by pigs during the breeding season and when people intervened to stop pigs from raiding crops. Coming into contact with sick pigs or their bodily fluids in the environment through shared food resources (such as eating contaminated fruits or tubers uprooted by pigs) particularly in the dry season was also reported. Similar interactions were reported very occasionally for forest hogs and red river hogs from specific regions only. The same pattern is reflected in bush meat practice -bush pigs and common warthogs are eaten by few households in all regions throughout the year or in some regions only when food is scarce. Forest hogs and red river hogs show similar frequency of harvesting but in specific regions only.
Fever in pigs a common problem reported by pig farmers
Pig fever is commonly reported by pig farmers in Uganda. Fever in pigs is attributed to African swine fever (ASF), a lethal haemorrhagic viral disease that produces fever and respiratory signs among others. Some of these clinical signs are similar to pigs experimentally infected with ZEBOV (Kobinger et al., 2011) . Considering the inconsistent and under-resourced diagnostic capability for pig pathogens in Uganda and the potential low disease prevalence thought to exist in the suspect reservoir hosts for Ebola virus and other viral haemorrhagic fevers (Reed, 2012; Olival and Hayman, 2014) , it is possible that Ebola virus infection in pigs goes undetected and is mistaken for other infections in pigs that cause similar symptoms.
Temporal correlation of outbreaks with peak pork consumption periods
It is typical for meat to be consumed on special occasions in Uganda. Producers and consumers eat pork, especially for Easter and Christmas . Overlaying Ebola virus outbreaks in Uganda with seasonal pork consumption patterns shows outbreaks near peak pork consumption periods (see Fig. 4 ), where increased handling, butchering and transporting of pigs would happen.
ASF epidemiology research in Uganda highlighted how the sale of sick pigs and the sale and consumption of pork from the dead pigs spread and extended an outbreak of ASF in Gulu (Tejler, 2012) . This outbreak of ASF happened near Independence Day, a national holiday where meat is typically consumed. In addition, the research doc- umented that many of the pigs that died as a result of the ASF outbreak were consumed either on the farm or sold to the butcher in the local community. Both the practice of eating pigs that have died of unknown causes and the sale of sick pigs would also spread and extend an outbreak of Ebola virus in pigs and increase the risk of spillover to humans.
Given that pork is a luxury item consumed for special occasions such as public holidays, the potential risk for zoonotic Ebola virus transmission from pigs to humans may be seasonal, linked with periods of greater pork consumption, and hence live pig sales and movement. The highest hypothesized risk is at farm level via direct contact with infected bodily fluids and during slaughtering, where contact with blood, internal organs and other bodily fluids is a part of the processing. At the household consumption level, the hypothesized risk of Ebola virus infection is most likely only if the raw pork is handled in preparation for cooking. Eating of processed pork does not pose a significant risk at present, based on current knowledge of Ebola virus stability and pork cooking and preservation techniques.
The role pigs play in the ecology and epidemiology of Ebola virus is unknown. Several hypothetical possibilities based on other relevant research findings are as follows.
Pig-wildlife-interface
Competition for fruit is a potential interface for transmission of Ebola virus between wildlife and pigs. In fact, questionnaire respondents reported shared feeding spots between pigs, bats and non-human primates.
Shared feeding around fruiting trees is a suitable environment for interspecies transmission from infected saliva deposited on fruit . Given the seasonal variance of antibody prevalence in bat species ) and seasonality of fruiting trees, this could result in temporal patterns of transmission between bats and pigs.
Questionnaire respondents reported some aggressive encounters between pigs and non-human primates. Aggressive encounters occur around food resources and non-human primate hunting of pigs. Chimpanzees are known to hunt bushpigs (Goodall, 1986; Boesch and Boesch, 1989; Uehara et al., 1992; Stanford and Wallis, 1994; Stanford, 1996) , which is characterized by opportunity or snatchand-run hunts (Stanford and Wallis, 1994) . This contact through hunting could transmit Ebola virus from infected pigs to chimpanzees.
Between pigs
Experimentally infected pigs spread ZEBOV to na€ ıve pigs presumably through aerosols from the oronasal mucosa, which were found to have high titres of ZEBOV (Kobinger et al., 2011) . Contact pigs had a less severe disease course than pigs that had been experimentally infected.
The selling of sick and dead pigs, as evidenced during the ASF outbreak in Gulu, are practices that increase the risk of spreading Ebola virus to humans and other pig farms. During the ASF outbreaks, sick pigs and contact pigs were transported 500 km through several districts in Uganda (Tejler, 2012) , creating suitable dynamics for secondary outbreaks and extension of the geographic range of Ebola virus outbreaks.
Furthermore, spread between domestic pigs and their wild counterparts, potentially amplifying the virus is possible. Uganda is the natural habitat for several widespread wild pig species: giant forest hog (Hylochoerus meinerthageni), Red River hog (Potamochoerus porcus), bushpig (Potamochoerus larvatus) and common warthog (Phacochoerus africanus). Bushpigs in particular have a wide distribution throughout East Africa, where they live and move at the interface of national parks and farmland. This interaction increases pathogen sharing between wild and domestic pigs (Blomstr€ om et al., 2012) . While transmission dynamics for Ebola virus have not been studied between wild and domestic pigs, possible routes may be through direct contact, contact with urine and faeces in the environment and sharing of food particularly during scavenging. Certainly, the large distances travelled by free-ranging domestic pigs for scavenging could be a risk factor for infection through direct contact, both between domestic pigs and between wild and domestic pigs.
Genotypic evidence of breeding between wild and domestic pigs is being investigated at Makerere University School of Population and Molecular Genetics in Uganda, as phenotypic evidence has been speculated here and elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. This inter-breeding could facilitate Ebola virus transmission. 
From pigs to humans
The intensification of pig production combined with poor pig husbandry and slaughter practices rampant throughout Uganda makes pig to human transmission a possibility. Direct contact with infected pigs by farmers, particularly through daily care, butchering and hunting provides contact with bodily fluids and other infectious fluids. Transmission is also possible through contact with contaminated inanimate objects or vegetation . A study on animal contacts in the western district of Uganda revealed pigs contributed to 5.6% of reported animal injures to people in the area surrounding Kibaale National Park, this compared to 1.7% by primates (Paige et al., 2014) .
In addition to direct contact, aerosol transmission between pigs and humans is a possibility that needs further exploration. Pig farmers in the Philippines were found to be seropositive to REBOV, despite not being involved with slaughtering pigs or having any known contact with infected carcasses (Barrette et al., 2009) . In an experimental study, pigs efficiently transmitted ZEBOV via aerosol to primates in conditions resembling a farm setting (Weingartl et al., 2012) . These results support transmission of Ebola virus between pigs and primates and provide evidence that transmission from pigs to humans needs to be considered, considering the similar pathogenesis of EVD in primates and humans.
Future directions
To support additional research, a risk map was created to identify the potential high-risk areas suitable for targeted porcine sampling. The potential areas of high risk as defined by zoonotic Ebola virus niche, pig production and high numbers of people living in poverty are shown in Fig. 5 . It is important to note that high-risk areas indicate areas correlating to the spatial overlap of risk for the resident population according to hypothesized, but as yet unproven risk factors. It does not indicate the actual likelihood of zoonotic spillover.
High-risk areas are found predominantly in the central and western parts of the country, with a few isolated areas in northern and eastern Uganda. All outbreak sites except for Gulu lie within clear risk areas. Considering Gulu lies as an outlier in the original zoonotic niche modelling data (Pigott et al., 2014) and is an area with virtually no pig production, this is not surprising. In addition, the cited human index cases for this outbreak does occur in an area with a large number of people living in extreme poverty and around a central forest reserve mosaic landscape, speculated to be highrisk environments for frequent human-animal contacts. One potential flaw in using the zoonotic niche data as an input layer for measuring risk in Uganda is that bat distributions used in the model are for three bat species that are found to have the most compelling evidence for carrying ZEBOV, an Ebola virus species which has not been reported from Uganda. Serological evidence for bat species carrying the strains found in Uganda is lacking. In this case, we are using the most comprehensive modelled zoonotic and ecological niche prediction data available. Future risk investigations using similar mapping methods could include (i) more collaborative organizational surveillance for reservoir bat species, other potential wildlife hosts and human populations in these hypothesized high-risk areas and (ii) analysis of specific ecological conditions such as high dependence on forest product utilization and certain biodiversity indicators, as well as behavioural associations with poverty, occupation and gender that may make risky zoonotic interactions and thus transmission of the virus to humans more likely.
Due to the sensitive nature of EVD and its tendency to create panic, disproportionate to the actual risk of infection, future research into the role pigs play in maintaining and transmitting Ebola virus needs to address: 1 The role pigs may play in Ebola virus transmission. The present data suggest they may be amplifying hosts, but not reservoir hosts. This suggests the conditions under which pigs become infection and the role they play in transmission may have many variables that will have to be elucidated. 2 Pig population dynamics as hosts of Ebola virus. 3 Risks factors to pig farming, specifically in relationship to bat and primate ecology and habitat. 4 Impact of Ebola virus on pig production, human health and livelihoods and food security. 5 Disease course and outcome of the different species of Ebola virus infection in pigs.
6 Communicating any risk of Ebola virus infection associated with pig production in ways that minimize adverse impacts on pig value chains, poverty and livelihoods.
